Christopher Braddock
This article discusses two installation artistsâFelix Gonzales-Torres and Dane Mitchellâwhose work explores a dispersion, or residue, of materials in ways that engage audiences in forms of unwitting participation. A unique aspect of the article is that these forms of participatory installation practice are explored through theories of so-called âprimitiveâ or âsavageâ magic ritual. To be more specific, magical concepts of âcontagionâ, âanimismâ and âritual participationâ are employed to open up a range of hotly debated questions about reciprocity between people and things, and, in turn, where âlivenessâ lives.
The article is based on a provocationâJacques Derridaâs notion of the âtrace structureâ is profoundly âsavageâ in its assertion that the sign has a real connection with its world. That word âsavageâ is used by late-nineteenth-century British anthropologists Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917) and James George Frazer (1854- 1941). They were baffled by the continuation of so-called âsavageâ beliefs and practices in their own contemporary societies. They managed, in fact, to disavow aspects of their own Christian heritage that involved some of the very animistic operations they saw as âsavageâ in their concurrent ethnographic work. Their disbelief in the force of magical ritual was partly due to their racialized and evolutionary-driven concept of âprimitivenessâ. In their minds, Culture, in opposition to the darkness of savage Nature, gradually became more and more civilized until its culmination in the white male Victorian intellect. What those anthropologists observed in âsavageâ magical practices was a breakdown in oppositional structures of life and death, organic and inorganic, subject and object, whiteness and blackness, linked to the possibility of a âforceâ that precedes those terms related and contagiously infiltrates all materiality beyond reason. This, it turns out, is a staple of Derridean deconstruction and the notion of diffĂ©rance or the âtrace structureâ. Discussing Felix Gonzales-Torresâs âUntitledâ (Lover Boys) series (from 1991), and New Zealand artist Dane Mitchellâs 2011 Radiant Matter series, this paper argues that the label âsavageâ is always already in excess of those ethnographic and historical constraints. Put another way, there are no savages, there never were. Or, put another way again, we are all savages.[1] Through the consumption of candies (Torres), or the activation of vaporous environments (Mitchell), these artworks provoke ideas of contagious and vital fields of affect that provoke unwitting forms of participation that operate beyond the senses.
What follows is a discussion in three parts. I begin with an outline of James George Frazerâs definition of âsympathetic magicâ while mindful of Felix Gonzales-Torresâs artwork. I then touch on Marcel Maussâs (1872-1950) notion of âeffluviaâ which âtravel aboutâ (1975: 72) from his A General Theory of Magic written between 1902 and 1903.[2] I interpret âeffluviaâ as a vaporous and contagious field of affect in relation to Derridaâs notion of the âtrace structureâ. Finally, I conclude with a critique of Dane Mitchellâs artwork alongside mention of Maussâs contemporary Lucien LĂ©vy-Bruhl (1875-1939) and his concept of âmystical participationâ. LĂ©vy-Bruhl describes a realm where âsubstanceâ is an immeasurable essence that amounts to participation because it is participated in.
Part 1: James George Frazerâs sympathetic magic
In his now infamous publication The Golden Bough (1890â1915), Frazer devises two laws, one of similarity and the other of contact, that function under the general name of âsympathetic magicâ. The first of these laws involving imitation or mimesis is underscored by the notion that âlike produces like, or that an effect resembles its causeâ while the second, involving contact, assumes that âthings which have once been in contact with each other continue to act upon each other at a distance after the physical contact has been severedâ (Frazer 1924: 11). Frazer further clarifies his terminology to describe this law of similarity as homoeopathic while the law of contact he defines as contagious magic.[3] In this context, he defines the most common forms of contagious magic as
the magical sympathy which is supposed to exist between a man and any severed portion of his person, as his hair or nails; so that whoever gets possession of the human hair or nails may work his will, at any distance, upon the person from whom they were cut. (38)
His terms of reference are very generalized and he extends this notion to items of clothing and impressions left by a body, including the possibility of injuring footprints in order to injure the feet that made them. The ânatives of South-eastern Australiaâ, Frazer says, âthink they can lame a man by placing sharp pieces of quartz, glass, bone, or charcoal in his footprintsâ (44). And Frazer concludes this section of The Golden Bough dedicated to âSympathetic Magicâ by referring to âa maxim with the Pythagoreans that in rising from bed you should smooth away the impression left by your body on the bed-clothesâ (45).
This idea that things might âact on each other at a distance through a secret sympathyâ is key, for example, to a series of artworks by Felix Gonzalez-Torres titled âUntitledâ (Lover Boys). The first of these installations, installed in 1991 at Xavier Hufkens Gallery, Brussels, employed a 355Â lb pile of candies equal to the combined body weights of Gonzalez-Torres and his partner Ross who died from AIDS in 1991.[4] This pile of candies on the floor of the gallery conjures up the possibility that this âlikeâ weight produces or performs them both and that the effect of this work will resemble its causeâwill effect an ongoing unity of artist and lover embodied in the bodies of the participating audiences who are free to consume the candies one by one as they pass by the work. Artist and lover, as âdonorsâ of this ritualized (votive) offering, therefore implicate the bodies of the audience in a profound form of contact (understood as contagious âcontiguityâ) through digestion, implicating the bodily nourishment of those viewer participants. By inversion, these are the objects of the viewersâ performance where those participating perform the work. As those participants leave the gallery they disperse, literally around the globe, continuing the action of their participation at a distance, long after their physical contact has been severed. These are the powerfully so-called âsavageâ operations of sympathetic magic at work in everyday consumption. Gonzalez-Torresâs candies are animated (in the order of the spell) by the utterance of the title, and related instructions stipulating the deployment of the work at each exhibition venue. Those participants do more than just suck on a candy. They consume (and thereby embody) the gay relationship. They become themselves animated by the magical âeffluviaâ of the artwork, to coin Marcel Maussâs term.[5] In this sense, while Gonzalez-Torresâs formal aesthetic (and content) would seem not to derive from a history of magic, its operational force is deeply âmagicalâ.
This thinking is partly made possible by the work of anthropologists in the 1960s such as Sri Lankan-born Stanley J. Tambiah (b. 1929) who argued that magic acts should be interpreted as performative acts rather than judged on the basis of scientific verification (1973: 199). In other words, to ask if magic works in terms of cause and effect is to have asked the wrong question. Instead he interprets magic ritual as engaging with objectives of âpersuasionâ, âconceptualisationâ and âexpansion of meaningâ (219). Thus he proposes as a new theory of magical language which helps retrieve a philosophy of language from its racist heritage and therefore from pre-conceptions associated with âblackâ magic. Accordingly, Tambiah develops an understanding of so-called primitive thinking in ritual as underpinned by a theory of performatives in an understanding of the agency of magic. In other words, it becomes a question of what the âperformativityâ, which is the practice of magic, does. This, therefore, allows an application of the theories of magic to coincide with theories that privilege the artwork as a process. In this sense magic is a âharnessing of forcesâ, an expression used by Simon OâSullivan (employing the ideas of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari) in suggesting the artwork is a âcreative deterritorialisation into the realm of affectsâ. With this in mind, OâSullivan continues (without subsequent mention of magic): âArt might be understood as the name for a function, a magical and aesthetic function of transformationâ (2006: 52).
The immense importance of Tambiahâs contribution (and others dealing with the linguistic properties of ritual[6]) lies in the fact that he re-examines a âdiscreditedâ non-modern worldview (that conceives of things as animated) through a concept of performative agency. He thus gives us back that discredited history in ways that enable us to re-consider what concepts like âmagicâ, âanimismâ and âspiritual essenceâ might signify. This, in turn, potentially enables us to reconsider our worldview in the light of those so-called âsavageâ histories. This creates a remarkable challenge to re-thinking the boundaries between subjects and objects, nature and culture, the psyche and the material world.
Frazer, of course, would be hostile to Gonzalez-Torresâs so-called âsavageâ thinking. He and his Victorian contemporaries equated the possibility of contagious animism with savage race relations. And in this respect, scholars such as Christopher Bracken argue, the philosophy of language is partly based on differences between races and has enforced a separation between signs and things. He writes: âThe point is that a difference between races has been projected onto an enduring scholarly debate about the relation between signs and thingsâ (2007: 6).
Part 2: Marcel Maussâs effluvia
The historical ethnography on magic grapples with the concept of âanimismâ as a belief that things in nature might possess consciousness, and a belief that people have spirits that can exist separately from their bodies, contaminating other objects and people. This is part of the overall concept of âcontagionâ which sustains a view that âlivenessâ does not reside in bodies or in things. It resides in what Mauss calls âeffluviaâ which âtravel aboutâ (1975: 72). In discussing the possibility that we have already encountered with Frazerâthat things act on each other at a distanceâMauss struggles with such a resistance to conventional notions of time and space. Hence he says that action at a distance involves âthe idea of effluvia which leave the bodyâ.[7] In characterizing âmagical images which travel aboutâ, Mauss cites an example from the Malleus maleficarum[8] of âa witch who dips her broom in a pond to bring on rain and then flies away into the air to search for itâ (72-3). Read here, Torres’s audiences who take a candy (thus bringing on participation) and then fly away in search of it and so on.
Significantly, Mauss develops this idea of âeffluviaâ as âmanaâ. This is a force and/or power or âmagic potenceâ which Mauss understands as âthe presence of a kind of magical potentialâ (107, 113, 121).[9] To get to this conclusion, Mauss has asserted an âideaâ of magic as âa field where ritual occurs ⊠a place where spirits come alive and where magical effluvia are waftedâ (118). This âideaâ (as distinct from the âouter formâ of magic) becomes crucial for Mauss, and it is this âidea which animates all the forms assumed by magicâ (118). This âideaâ develops into an understanding of magic as a âsocial phenomenonâ, as a âfunctioning of collective lifeâ and âcollective thinkingâ (119, 121). It is only âa non-intellectualist psychology of man as a communityâ, says Mauss, that will tolerate this âideaâ of magic (108).
From this perspective, Maussâs contemporary Lucien LĂ©vy-Bruhl (1875-1939) can say in his Notebooks on Primitive Mentality written between 1938 and 1939 that âparticipationâ exists as a felt experience of a community of essence which has an equivalence to the act of participating. He writes: âparticipation between the individual and his appurtenances (hair, nails, excretions, clothing, footprints, shadows, etc.) âŠ. equals a community of essence [as an] identity felt between what participates and what is âparticipated inâ â (1975: 108). Thus LĂ©vy-Bruhlâs notion of âmystical participationâ describes a field of participants already affected (or contaminated) and not a verifiable or rational play between elements, living or dead or inorganic. It is there because it is participated in. As Rodney Needham notes, the overwhelming breakthrough that LĂ©vy-Bruhl offers at this time was a realization that âthe strangeness of primitive mentality were not mere errors, as detected by a finally superior rationality of which we were the fortunate possessors, but that other civilizations presented us with alternative categories and modes of thoughtâ (1972: 183).
LĂ©vy-Bruhlâs concept of of âmystical participationâ (discussed further in Part 3 of this article) describes a realm where âsubstanceâ is an infinite essence that equals participation because it is participated in. From this key idea I argue for an ontology of participation that emphasizes a âvalueâ or meaning that precedes the terms related of subject/object, organic/inorganic. Moreover, things (and their substances) cannot be determined by a âseries of antecedents which result in some eventâ LĂ©vy-Bruhl writes (1975: 133). Instead, they telepathically operate across space and time because they precede the terms related (animate and inanimate). Thus this mode of thought suggests an existent or a there in a field of affect that is already infiltrated, already contaminated, and exceeding participants. But here the term âparticipantsâ is expanded to acknowledge all the secondary terms in an arbitrary dichotomy of animate/inanimate, subject/object, presence/absence and so forth. This, as said at the beginning of this article, is a significant aspect of Derridean deconstruction and the notion of diffĂ©rance or the âtrace structureâ.
In his address to the French Society of Philosophy on the 27th of January 1968 titled Différance, Derrida calls this inseparability and unlocatability of these binary terms a double gesture that shares the characteristics of temporization and spacing.
As an abbreviated overview, Derrida explains that the verb âdiffĂ©rerâ carries two meanings: one associated with âa detour, a delay, a relay, a reserveâ which acts as a âtemporizationâ in time that âsuspends the accomplishment or fulfillment of âdesireâ or âwillâ â (8). The second meaning is associated with a space between polemical terms such as speech/writing, subject/object, organic/inorganic that is not identical to another as âan interval, a distance, spacingâ that is produced in repetition (8). Accordingly, the word diffĂ©rance (with an âaâ) compensates for the word âdiffĂ©renceâ in that it simultaneously refers to this âtemporizationâ and the polemical while also denoting an undecided sense of movement as neither active or passive (8-9). This suggests that there can be no sense of an âaction of a subject on an objectâ (9). This will mean a radical deconstruction of a notion of presence (or âlivenessâ) and how it might be understood to operate, even telepathically, in relation to time and space.
I argue that the operations of sympathetic magic incite these qualities of the âtrace structureâ in diffĂ©rance. The audacity of magic ritual is that it presumes that the sign is the thing. The footprint, the saliva, the breath, is the person. The operations of Derridaâs trace structure as a temporization in time and spacing as action at a distance, like magic, questions a classical understanding of the âsignâ as meaning a ârepresentationâ of presence. When Frazer says of the operations of sympathy and contact (to repeat an earlier reference) that âlike produces likeâ or that âthings which have once been in contact with each other continue to act upon each other at a distance after the physical contact has been severedâ (1924: 11), he grapples with an idea that he cannot tolerate: that the âtraceâ of these magical operations might constitute a questioning of presence (the implications of which are profound in questioning the value of a unified, cognitive subject). The âtrace structureâ helps us understand that Frazerâs âLaw of Contagionâ (in its combination of similitude and contact) reveals an already contaminated field; an âeffluviaâ as a contaminated relationality that precedes and exceeds the terms related (subject/object, presence/absence).
As I will continue to argue, this already contaminated field is important to an understanding of Torresâs and Mitchellâs artworks.
Part 3: Dane Mitchellâs Radiant Matter
For Various Solid States (2010/2011) as part of Radiant Matter I at the Govett-Brewster Art Gallery, Mitchellâs instructions to the staff are specific but open-endedâpour one cast per day but more if humid conditions create enough fluid. Perform this task before the gallery opens but a little after is fine (or during the day if necessary), and try to pour shapes that are ambiguous, that is, not too figurative (thus avoiding Mickey Mouse ears and so forth). Following these instructions, each morning gallery staff retrieve water, accumulated overnight in a dehumidifier, to mix plaster from the 20 kilo bags stacked adjacent in the same exhibition space. After removing the previous (now set) plaster pour and propping it against the walls of the galleryâalong with all the other plaster casts from previous daysâthe fresh plaster mix is poured out onto a roll of bubble-wrap, itself a membrane of stored air pockets. Mitchell describes this process as a âtransformation of matter from one state to anotherâ in the simplest possible terms. Accordingly, the techniques employed are domestic, or studio based, while the atmosphere captured is, Mitchell comments, âinfused with our own liquids, our own exhalationsâ.[10]
As another activation of vaporous environments, Epitaph (2011)âas part of Radiant Matter II, at the Dunedin Public Art Galleryâemploys an empty late-Victorian vitrine from the holdings of the Dunedin Public Art Gallery. Each morning gallery staff are instructed to open the rear glass door of the cabinet and spray a quantity of scent onto its mirrored base. Through a 20 CM hole cut in the frontal glass face of the vitrine, the viewer is able to lean forward, slightly into the hole, and sniff the scent.[11] Mitchell explains that the fragrance (made in collaboration with the perfumer Michel Roudnitska) includes a synthesized reproduction of musk produced by the civet cat: an intensely bodily odor. Using such an aroma, Mitchell is attempting to activate smell as a medium, or âeffluviaâ, that resists definition and one that reaches back into our animalistic and sexualized primordial responses.[12]
This assertion is further emphasized in Mitchellâs more overt references to magic ritual. For example, Gateway to the Etheric Realm (2011) as part of Radiant Matter II displays the remnants of magical spells and cantations. Mitchell hired the services of a local witch to enter the exhibition space for six private rituals, leaving behind the debris of crystallized dragons blood, herbs, owl feathers, infused blessed water, incense, charcoal and salt. Adjacent to this artwork, Etheric Realm Spell Materials (2011) stacks glass vials with these material residues, in turn, encasing these vials in a glazed picture frame. These direct references to magical practices alert us to a realm that cannot be justified by scientific intellectualization.
The artworks of Torres and Mitchell complicate distinctions between art as commodity or aesthetic form. In turn, they amplify our experiences of participation as uncontrollable encounter. Our saliva, our exhalations, or those vaporous scents, infiltrate all matter. Or put another way, those plaster shapes and that perfume are inseparable from us and our breathing vapour. Likewise, magical ritualsâin their âpurportedâ ability to confound boundaries between a natural world of objects, material substances and human bodiesâpresent, in the words of Frazer, âa spurious system of natural law as well as a fallacious guide of conductâ. It is âfalse science as well as an abortive artâ, continues Frazer (1924: 11). In this sense, the possibility of ritual contagious animism threatens the foundations of Platonic mimesis. Plato banishes the artist from the city, not so much because of a threat to truth, but because of a threat to order. âThrough his doublings and multiplicationsâ, Christopher Prendergast writes, âthe mimetic artist introduces âimproprietiesâ (a âpoisonâ) into a social system ordered according to the rule that everything and everyone be in its/his/her proper placeâ (1986: 10). Letâs not forget that Platoâs Socrates says that imitation is about âlooksâ and not the âtruthâ and âit is due to this that it produces everythingâbecause it lays hold of a certain small part of each thing, and that part is itself only a phantomâ (BookX/598b). As such, Platoâs Socrates speaks of the artist as wizard and imitator. Thus, Platoâs Socrates continues, âhe has encountered some wizard and imitator and been deceivedâ (BookX/598d). In this way, Plato provocatively positions the artist as the source of magical utterance.[13]
Moreover, magicâs combination of body substances (breath, saliva, aroma, spittle, nails, hair, etc.) with other materials (plant residue, ashes, etc.), like Torresâs candies dissolved in the mouths of participants and Mitchellâs transformation of our vaporous exhalations, provokes an idea of consubstantiation between persons and things; it conjures forth the already contaminated field of the animate and inanimate, living or dead. In this respect, Mitchell deploys smell or aroma as a performative encounter. When Mitchell says of his project Radiant Matter that he deploys âperfume as a concentrated form of lossâ he is engaging with a âtrace structureâ where, Derrida says, âerasureâ forms its constitution âfrom the outset as a traceâ (1982: 24). Perfume will always evaporate and in this sense it lacks clear description or defies definition. This is radical because the sign (the aroma) does not represent. Again in the words of Derrida, this operation âmakes it disappear in its appearanceâ (24). In this realmâlike Maussâs effluviaââsubstanceâ is an infinite essence that exists as a felt community because it is participated in.
Lucien LĂ©vy-Bruhlâs concept of âmystical participationâ
The remaining discussion is dedicated to the extraordinary insights of LĂ©vy-Bruhl and his emphasis on collective representations that led him to argue that participation was not a comprehensible relation between individuals or things.
For example, in discussing the participation between a corpse and its ghost, LĂ©vy-Bruhl asserts that: âIt is equally true to say that the corpse is the deceased, and that it is not.â âThis provesâ he continues, âthat neither expression is correctâ (1975: 1). He qualifies this statement by affirming that this notion of âparticipationâ cannot presuppose a connection or representation, it occurs simultaneously with them:
participation is not established between the more or less clearly represented deceased and corpse (in which case it would be of the nature of a relationship or connection, and it should be possible to make it easily comprehensible); it does not come after these representations, it does not presuppose them: it is before them, or at least simultaneous with them. What is given in the first place is participation. (2)
When LĂ©vy-Bruhl says âwhat is given in the first placeâ, he questions a notion of âpresenceâ as a âconceptâ that appears a priori before participationâs affect. Thus, he calls attention to the labels âpresenceâ and âabsenceâ, or âsubjectâ and âobjectâ, that problematically presuppose the presence of those concepts before their relation. If a notion of âparticipationâ is thought of as a âconceptâ, he argues, it becomes ânecessary to involve the presence of those concepts of the things between which the participation is establishedâ (3). LĂ©vy-Bruhl does not want to put the concept of the signâthat which Derrida says, âalways has meant the representation of a presenceâ (1982: 10)âin place of the thing itself. Magic, in this way, undermines the presumed secondary and provisional nature of the sign and dares to question the authority of presence, or of its simple symmetrical opposite, the inanimate and dead.[14] We recall Derridaâs discussion of the âtrace structureâ as diffĂ©rance where this âtermâ is neither a word nor a concept. It is this âintervalâ of meaning, Derrida notes, that âmaintains our relationship with that which we necessarily misconstrue, and which exceeds the alternative of presence and absenceâ (20). In this sense, LĂ©vy-Bruhlâs notion of âparticipationâ has nowhere to begin. Magical participation therefore calls into question what Derrida refers to as âa rightful beginning, an absolute point of departure, a principal responsibilityâ and therefore opens up a question of value as a controlling principle and system (6). This kind of âsavageâ thinking about a concept of âparticipationâ urges LĂ©vy-Bruhl to abandon an intellectualization of what he calls âmystical participationâ, where, he says in a very Derridean fashion, âeven simply expressing it in our vocabulary with our concepts, falsifies itâ (1975: 1). Moreover, in introducing an inability for western ethnographers to comprehend what he termed âprimitive mentalitiesâ, he puts in place a vastly significant milestone for future developments in cultural anthropology. Not only is an intellectualization of âmystical participationâ a problem for the ethnographic âframingâ of other peoples (in that it presents us with alternative categories of thinking outside our own experience), it raises the potential impossibility of comprehending a field of affective participation. Hence, LĂ©vy-Bruhl sees magical or mystical participation as âthe affective category of the supernaturalâ that is ânot represented but feltâ (4-5, 106, 158).[15]
In short, participation cannot be determined through antecedents but in the course of participation (LĂ©vy-Bruhl 1975: 133). In this context, LĂ©vy-Bruhl makes a striking example of Melanesian languages and their names for a personâs finger (natugu or natuku) that combine, he deduces, possessive and personal pronouns that attribute the finger as âfinger of meâ (107). This, he deduces, means that âthis finger is me through participation (in the sense where to be is equivalent to to participate)â (107, emphasis added). This means that participation precedes the identity of the finger. Furthermore, he makes this observation while categorizing the finger as an âappurtenanceââthat is, an accessory or adjunct to the human body suggestive of a reassessment of the fingerâs subjecthood and positing the idea of the finger as neither part subject or object. Rather, identity occurs simultaneously in participation.
In these ways LĂ©vy-Bruhl re-configures a concept of âanimismâ. Rather than a spiritual supplement that intervenes from an exterior source (as a life/matter binary), he understands âmystical participationâ in the operations of magical ritual as emerging from collective and incomprehensible dynamics. This relational dynamic is non-rational because it precedes an organic/inorganic divide. To say again that extraordinary claim by LĂ©vy-Bruhl cited above: âWhat is given in the first place is participationâ (2).
Conclusion
The artworks of Felix Gonzales Torres and Dane Mitchell engage in fields of contagious affect that infiltrate all bodies (animate or inanimate) in forms of ritual participation. This means, not just we âsubjectsâ, but us âobjectsâ too. Our habitually polemical categorizations of people and things are made problematic in a radical questioning of where âlivenessâ lives. This highlights modes of unwitting participation in which âvalueâ or meaning precedes the terms related of subject/object, organic/inorganic. From this perspective, âlivenessâ does not reside in bodies or in things. It resides in what Mauss calls âeffluviaâ which âtravel aboutâ (1975: 72). Here, the signâlike Mitchellâs effusive aromasâappears beyond reasonable representation as a collective dynamic inseparable from bodily encounter.
This way of thinking about a dispersion, or residue, of materials in performative installation art (and the objects of performance as such) allows for intense alternations of time (temporization as deferment) and space (interval and distancing as differentiation). We recall here Tambiahâs main objective in all his approaches to anthropology, which is to overturn an ethnographic view of (black) magic as a âprimitiveâ and failed science and to lend it instead the agency of performativity. Here, the force of the trace refers us beyond any intellectualization of participation and beyond language to the point that we ask what other language this is (Derrida 1982: 25).
[1] See Christopher Bracken as he writes: âThere is no such thing as a savage society, nor has there ever been. Savage philosophers are the outgrowths of discourse, and they dare us to think more by daring to enrich signs with a principle of changeâ (2007: 21).
[2] As Michael Taussig notes that, while this work is attributed to Marcel Mauss, the original Année sociologique essay is credited to joint authorship of Henri Hubert and Mauss (1993: 258n14).
[3] James George Frazerâs use of the term âhomeopathicâ is a manifestation of the (metonymic) idea in homeopathy that a diluted element (a part of a whole) carries the healing force of the whole.
[4] The nature of the candy pieces is that they can also be installed at alternate weights. For example, the work âUntitledâ (Revenge) has an ideal weight of 325 lbs (first installed in Madrid in 1991). Also during Felix Gonzalez-Torresâs lifetime, in 1994, he installed the work at 1000 lbs at the Renaissance Society in Chicago. For further context, when asked by Bob Nickas when interviewed for Flash Art, Nov/Dec 1991, p. 89, âCan you talk about how the candy pieces relate to memory and the body?â, Gonzalez-Torres replies, âThe pieces called Lover Boys are piles of candy based on body weights. I use my own weight or mine and Rossâs together. If I do a portrait of someone, I use their weight.â Thanks to Allison Hemler, Director of Archives and Communications, The Felix Gonzalez-Torres Foundation, for these details.
[5] This concept of âparticipationâ as an uncontrollable and contagious âtrace structureâ is also exemplified by Jacques Derridaâs notion of the impossibility of the gift. From this perspective, I would not know I am being given the relationship and they would not know they have given it to me. Thus the âvalueâ, or âforceâ, of the artwork precedes the participants.
[6] Stanley J. Tambiah was certainly not alone in his thinking of the performative nature of ritual and the application of, for example, the performative theories of language by J. L. Austin. See, for example, Ruth Finnegan, âHow to Do Things with Words: Performative Utterances Among the Limba of Sierra Leone,â Man, n.s. 4, no. 4, 1969, pp. 537â52, especially pp. 548â550. As Catherine Bell notes: âFinnegan also pointed out that the notion of performative utterance solves the difficulties posed by a polarization of utilitarian-functionalist versus expressive-symbolic styles of speech and action, which was, of course, the type of distinction that kept differentiating magic, science, and religion, as well as drawing distinctions between primitive versus modernâ (1997: 69n28).
[7] As a continuation of this discussion about âaction-at-a-distance,â see Chapter 2 of my forthcoming book Performing Contagious Bodies where I propose the âsymâ of âsympathyâ and the âteleâ of âtelepathyâ as two modalities of affect.
[8] The Malleus Maleficarum(Latin for âHammer of the Witchesâ, or âDer Hexenhammerâ) is a treatise on witches written in 1486 by Heinrich Kramer and Jacob Sprenger, Inquisitors of the Catholic Church, and was first published in Germany in 1487.
[9] Mauss is referencing the contemporaneous ethnographer of the North American Huron (Iroquois), J. N. B. Hewitt, as he develops this idea of âeffluviaâ as âmanaâ.
[10] Conversation with the author, 5 July 2012. I thank Dane Mitchell for his generosity in the preparations for this article.
[11] As Aaron Kreisler notes: âWorking with the perfumer Michel Roudnitska, Mitchell produces a scent whose base notes allude to a bodily (ghostly) presence, with a lingering hint of dust. The potency of this synthesised perfume is both amplified and clarified by its placement in a seemingly empty late Victorian vitrineâ (2011: 38).
[12] Conversation with the author, 5 July 2012.
[13] See The Republic of Plato, (Allan Bloom, Trans.), New York: Basic Books (Plato 1991: 281).
[14] I am following Derridaâs phrasing here when he says that diffĂ©rance âputs into question the authority of presence, or of its simple symmetrical opposite, absence or lackâ (10).
[15] See Benson Saler who borrows from Jean Cazeneuveâs analysis of LĂ©vy-Bruhl where this âaffectiveâ category becomes âthat of the role of affectivity of thoughtâ (2003: 48). Saler is quoting Jean Cazeneuve, Lucien LĂ©vi-Bruhl, Peter Riviere (trans.), New York, Harper and Row, 1963, p. 22. With respect to LĂ©vy-Bruhlâs notion of âparticipationâ, Saler argues for an âattempt to explore the affective as well as cognitive significance of beliefs for those who affirm themâ (55). To my mind his discussion that âthe border between these analytical domains is unstable and fuzzyâ (55) does not fully account for LĂ©vy-Bruhlâs attempt to abandon categorization of âparticipationâ as incomprehensible.
References
Bell, Catherine (1997) Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions, New York: Oxford University Press.
Bracken, Christopher (2007) Magical Criticism: the Recourse of Savage Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Derrida, Jacques (1982) ‘DiffĂ©rance’, (Alan Bass, Trans.) Margins of Philosophy (pp. 1-27), Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press.
Kreisler, Aaron (2011) ‘Radiant Matter II’, in Dane Mitchell (ed.) Radiant Matter I/II/III, Berlin: Berliner KĂŒnstlerprogramm/DAAD & ARTSPACE Auckland, Dunedin Public Art Gallery, Govett-Brewster Art Gallery.
LĂ©vy-Bruhl, Lucien (1975) The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality, (Peter RiviĂšre, Trans.), Oxford: Blackwell.
Mauss, Marcel (1975) A General Theory of Magic, (Robert Brain, Trans.), London: The Norton Library.
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This article is reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. It reproduces sections of writing from: Braddock, Christopher (2013) Performing Contagious Bodies: Ritual Participation in Contemporary Art, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Chris Braddock is an artist and academic. He is Associate Professor of visual arts in the School of Art & Design, AUT University, New Zealand, and Chair of the AUT St Paul St Gallery. His art practice involves performance, video, sound and sculpture. See www.christopherbraddock.net. His theoretical research employs key terms such as: animism, material trace, performance and photography/video, part-object/part-sculpture, art and spirituality, blasphemy.